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"...Freakonomics meets ESPN." —Alan
Schwarz, author, The Numbers Game
Taking Measure of the Many Myths
in Modern Sport
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Reviews | What's Inside | Where to Order | Stanford University Press |
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Chapter
Excerpts
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Chapter Nine: How are
Quarterbacks Like Mutual Funds? from Payroll and Wins, pp. 190-192 We
began our story with one piece of empirical evidence, that team payroll is a
poor predictor of team performance in baseball, basketball, and football. Our
examination of consistency gives us one reason why wages and wins are so
poorly connected. Consider briefly the story of Brian Griese.
A glance back at Table 9.7 reveals that Griese’s
production in 2000 ranked ninth best among the quarterbacks we examined from
1995 to 2005. Griese only played ten games in 2000 for the
Denver Broncos, but his performance was truly spectacular. His net points per
play was 0.287 with a quarterback rating of 102.9.Nineteen of his passes were
for touchdowns, while only four passes were intercepted. We must remember
that Griese inherited the job of Broncos signal
caller from the legendary John Elway. When Elway led Denver to its Super Bowl titles after the 1997
and 1998 regular seasons, his net points per play in each campaign was 0.173
and 0.229, respectively. These were above average efforts, but not nearly the
level of production Griese offered in 2000. Based
on the ten games Griese played in 2000, the Broncos
made him the highest paid player in the NFL. According to USA Today, the bonuses and base salary paid to Griese in 2001 totaled $15,154,000. Clearly the Broncos
interpreted Griese’s ten-game performance in 2000
as an indication that their quarterback was one of the best, if not the best,
quarterback in the game. Unfortunately,
as our analysis has indicated, quarterbacks are indeed like mutual funds.
Again we note, past performance is no guarantee of
future returns. In 2001, Griese’s performance
declined, specifically with respect to interceptions. From our analysis of
consistency, a quarterback’s propensity to throw to the other team is one of
the most difficult facets of productivity to predict. In fifteen starts in
2001, Griese had nineteen passes intercepted. As a
result, his net points per play declined to 0.066, a mark that is clearly
below average. The
Griese story highlights the problem for decision
makers in the NFL. Based on his 2000 performance, Griese
was the best quarterback in the league. Unfortunately, quarterbacks are
consistently inconsistent. After paying Griese a
salary justified by his productivity in 2000, his productivity in 2001
dropped considerably. We would emphasize that we doubt this had anything to
do with his effort level. Griese probably tried
just as hard in 2001 as he did in 2000. But
the external factors that allow a quarterback to perform well—offensive line,
receivers, running game, coaching, opponent’s defense—did not work as well
for Griese in 2001 as they appeared to work in
2000. Of course members of the sports media might argue that the Broncos
should have known that 2000 was a fluke. Well, in 2002 Griese’s
net points per play rose to a respectable 0.175. In 2004, playing for the
Tampa Bay Buccaneers, his net points per play was 0.161. Both efforts,
although not equal to his 2000 effort, were above average. With all that we
have learned about a quarterback’s performance from season to season, it is
not clear that the Broncos could have known that Griese’s
performance would decline in 2001. In fact, it is not clear that anyone can
accurately predict performance in the NFL. Thus
the basic premise behind the payroll and wins argument appears to fall apart.
People argue that teams can just buy wins. But for this to be true, one first
has to predict performance accurately. Given the inconsistency in performance
in sports, it is not clear that people can make these
predictions consistently. At least, in the sports of football and baseball,
this would seem quite difficult. In basketball, though, we do observe
some consistency in performance. Despite greater consistency, the link between
payroll and wins in basketball is similar to what we observe in baseball. In the
final chapter of our story we will explore a further
problem with
player evaluation on the court. Excerpts (c) 2006 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland
Stanford Jr. University. No further
use, reproduction or distribution of this material is allowed without the
written permission of the publisher. |
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